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ABSTRACT
ealth Technology Assessment (HTA) is used to assess the value of new technologies and by producing coverage recom-
mendations it indirectly controls the uptake of new technologies in many European countries. While HTA generally 
relies on a robust assessment of the clinical cost-effectiveness of a new technology, the clinical and economic evidence 
required for this purpose is often not available for Orphan Drugs (ODs), partly because of challenges related to the recruitment 
of patients to participate in clinical trials. A number of European HTA agencies have started to implement specific policies to 
address the challenges related to evidence requirements for the case of ODs. In this study, we map out the policies currently in 
place in eight European countries regarding HTA and its application to the case of ODs and explore the implications these poli-
cies have for coverage decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Across many European Union (EU) health systems, well-defined processes are in place to determine expected value for 
money when new health care technologies, among them pharmaceuticals, come to market. These processes, collectively referred 
to as Health Technology Assessment (HTA), differ between countries in their methodological basis, and in the way value is de-
termined, implying that the outcome of assessments can differ significantly [1] with consequences for access to medicines across 
member states (MS) [2].
Orphan drugs (ODs) treat conditions recognised as “rare” by generally accepted thresholds, with a prevalence of less than 
5 cases per 10,000 population in the EU [3]. Because markets for ODs by definition are small, a variety of incentives exist to 
stimulate research and development into these disease areas both at national and EU level. In order to incentivise the process of 
drug approval, all new ODs seeking marketing authorisation (MA) are assessed at EU level by the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA). This ensures homogeneity in the assessment process. However, such homogeneity does not exist at the point where newly 
authorised ODs seek reimbursement by health systems in individual MS. This is because processes assessing reimbursement and 
value for money of new drugs, including orphans, differ quite significantly across EU MS. As part of this variability in value as-
sessment processes, including the way HTA is implemented, it is not uncommon for two health systems to arrive at different con-
clusions about the value of a new product [4]. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that there is significant variation in the outcomes 
of HTA processes for ODs across some MS, suggesting access to these drugs could be different across different health systems [5]. 
This is supported by a survey showing that 90% of a sample of 60 ODs was found to be available in France, the Nether-
lands and Denmark, whereas only one third were available in Spain, Greece and Romania [6]. Financial considerations often 
influence access to medicines in many countries. A recent survey reported that nearly a quarter of the 22 European countries 
surveyed (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) restricted access to ODs due to budgetary constraints. Based on the 
same survey, only 5 countries always granted access to ODs, while several authorised access but with possible restrictions, such 
as prior authorisation [7]. 
In many cases, it is the outcome of the HTA process that determines on which grounds ODs should be made available or 
not. The conduct of HTA appraisals for ODs is associated with its own challenges, one of which is the recruitment of adequate 
numbers of patients into clinical trials due to the small overall patient population for a given indication [8]. Consequently, the 
extent of clinical evidence available at marketing authorisation (MA) and the level of statistical confidence authorities can place 
in this evidence may fall short of what HTA agencies normally consider to be adequate [9]. 
This is particularly relevant for rare diseases (RDs), because the higher prices may not be commensurate to the expected 
level of evidence regarding benefit. As a consequence, ODs are often not considered a cost-effective use of resources under stan-
dard criteria; this has led to a number of exceptions in the way ODs are appraised, such as taking into account the severity of 
disease or the availability of therapeutic alternatives [10]. 
The relatively small budget impact of ODs in some cases has often facilitated their market entry, for example with Germany 
or France reimbursing ODs if the total budget for a particular indication is under a certain ceiling [11]. However, the overall 
budget impact of ODs has been increasing in recent years, raising questions for policy makers about the value for money they 
offer relative to other health interventions. In particular the European system of orphan drug designation has been criticised 
as a mechanism whereby pharmaceutical manufacturers “game” the system, achieving higher prices for their products across 
multiple indications [4]. There are also examples of ODs being approved for wider use, and of older molecules (e.g. thalidomide) 
being re-branded under an orphan indication with a mani-fold price increase [12]. 
The aim of special European legislation to encourage research and development in ODs was to make new treatments avail-
able to patients, but it has been argued that high prices often associated with ODs are having the opposite effect. Additionally, 
the practices of international price referencing and parallel trade ensure that these high prices are similar across all EU countries. 
With the dominant position of an orphan MA, which in most cases will face no competition, it has even been suggested that it may 
be necessary to invoke EU competition law (Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) to scrutinise 
the fairness of these prices [13]. 
Such observations underline the need for a comprehensive understanding of value assessment mechanisms of ODs, so that 
prices may be understood and debated in their proper context. The European Commission has promoted the creation of a mecha-
nism for the exchange of knowledge between the EU MS and European Authorities on Clinical Added Value for Orphan Drugs 
(CAVOD), whereby a mechanism has been proposed to facilitate MS in the scientific assessment of the clinical effectiveness of 
ODs and develop a bridge between pre-market authorisation phases (clinical development) at EU level and post-marketing au-
thorisation phases at MS level [14]. More recently, the Mechanism of Coordinated Access to Orphan Medicinal Products (MOCA) 
led by the European Commission aimed to enhance patient access to ODs based on programmes between manufacturers and 
groups of competent authorities [15].
Many aspects need to be considered in the context of national OD reimbursement: The lack of existing treatment options 
due to rarity of the condition and equity of access to treatment among different population segments, as well as providing fair 
returns on investment for research-based entities, while facing the reality of budget constraints. The objective of this study is to 
outline the existing national policies for ODs with particular emphasis on special considerations made in the HTA process in 
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order to understand the explicit criteria in place for OD reimbursement. The study goes beyond HTA to encompass aspects of 
policy such as risk-sharing agreements at MS level and explores the implications for access.
METHODS
The study relies on primary and secondary 
evidence drawn from eight EU Member States. 
The study countries are England, France, Germa-
ny, Italy, Poland, Scotland, Spain and Sweden and 
were selected because of the variety in their health 
system financing (tax and social insurance-based), 
organisation (central and regional organisation and 
delivery of services) and HTA processes they use. 
For example, the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) in England implements a 
health system perspective, while Sweden follows a 
societal approach to value assessment; France, on 
the other hand, implements a clinical approach to 
value assessment rather than relying on cost-effec-
tiveness (until the end of 2013), for prescription 
medicines licensed for the first time, whereas in 
Spain HTA may be used at regional level to inform 
decision-making in some technologies, although 
this is not routine practice across all health tech-
nologies and, in particular, pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. 
Formal processes within each country for the appraisal of ODs were identified and reviewed by searching the relevant 
government agency websites for “rare diseases” in the local language, supplemented by searches of the peer review literature. 
The search strategy for the identification of OD assessment processes is presented in detail in Table 1. To ensure consistency of 
the search algorithm, Google (http://www.google.com) was used to perform the search using the “site” modifier, and the first 20 
results were screened for relevance for each country. 
The findings were confirmed and supplemented by 15 national key informants (KIs) by conducting semi-structured inter-
views, which took place from May 2013 to August 2013. KIs were presented with results from the grey literature search and were 
invited to add any additional information or clarifications. The questions shown on Table 2 have guided these discussions. The 
difference in the number of individuals contacted and interviewed reflects differences in the input provided by each informant 
and the structure of the health system in each of the study countries: England (1), France (3), Germany (2), Italy (3), Poland (1), 
Table 1. Search strategy for the identification of 
Orphan Drugs assessment processes
COUNTRY SEARCH TERM
England Site: nice.org.uk rare diseases
Scotland Site: scottishmedicines.org.uk rare diseases
Sweden Site: tlv.se sällsynta diagnoser
France Site: has-sante.fr maladies rares
Germany Site: iqwig.de seltene Erkrankungen
Spain Site: aemps.gob.es enfermedades raras
Site: isciii.es enfermedades raras
Italy Site: agenziafarmaco.gov.it malattie rare
Site: sihta.it malattie rare
Site: agenas.it malattie rare
Poland Site: aotm.gov.pl rzadkie choroby
Table 2. Semi-structured interview guide to inform primary data collection from key informants on national rare 
disease policies (May - August 2013)
QUESTION
1 Please describe any processes and policies that could affect the appraisal of medicines for rare diseases 
in your country. This does not have to be explicit “rare disease” policies/processes, but any aspects that could 
be relevant (for example, whether there are special criteria for unmet clinical need, fast-track procedures for 
innovative medicines, among others).
2 If there are specific processes/policies for rare diseases:
What are the official documents/sources describing these?
How do HTA processes for orphan drugs deviate from standard HTA processes, if at all?
Are there different criteria used in the final decision (e.g. unmet need, disease severity, lower statistical 
thresholds for evidence used, among others)?
In what way(s) are relevant stakeholders (e.g. patients, clinicians, etc) involved in orphan drug ap-
praisal? Is this involvement different for orphan drug assessment than it is for non-orphan drugs?
Is there a different (explicit or implicit) willingness to pay threshold for rare disease drugs?
3 If there are no specific processes/policies for rare diseases:
Are there any technical barriers hindering this? (for example, lack of evidence, lack of  funds, lack of 
technical expertise)
Are there political barriers?
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Table 3. Summary of HTA criteria directly and indirectly relevant to orphan drugs, 2013
Specific OD criteria for HTA Other policies and HTA criteria that are not specific to ODs but can 
also apply to ODs 
Policy Policy [criteria] Responsible au-
thority
England NICE HST1 section for appraising ultra-
orphan drugs; no explicit remit for ODs 
unless it is for cancer indications
IFR2 for medicines not routinely reimbursed, but 
must consider “exceptionality rule”
PCTs3 (prior to 
ongoing NHS 
reforms)
France Benefit considered proven at MA if bud-
get impact is less than €30m per annum 
for a particular indication
ATU4 if condition is life-threatening or/and there 
is no therapeutic alternative; Temporary Treat-
ment Protocols
ANSM5
Fast track HTA in place if: (a) new therapeutic 




Germany Lower accepted significance levels for p-
values (e.g. 10% significance levels) for 
small sample sizes such as RD popula-
tions; acceptance of evidence from sur-
rogate endpoints rather than only ‘hard’ 
endpoints; Additional benefit is consid-
ered proven at MA6 if budget impact is 
less than €50m per annum
n/a n/a
Italy n/a Reimbursement procedure considers, among 
other things, clinical need, existing therapies and 
budget impact.
AIFA7
National Health Care Plan for Rare Diseases 
for the period 2013-16 is under development, 
including a section on access to ODs.
Ministry of Health
In the event an OD is not reimbursed centrally, it 




Fast-track mechanism for ODs to enter pricing/
reimbursement negotiation before MA
AIFA
Access to innovative treatments for disorders 
where no alternative therapy is available is pro-
vided by law (No. 648/96). The law applies 1) to 
(innovative) medicines already approved in other 
countries but not yet in Italy, 2) to products, 
which have demonstrated clear benefit while 
“under clinical investigation” and 3) for off-label 
use.
AIFA CTS8
“Fondo AIFA 5%” (established under Law No. 
326/2003). Half of the fund should be devoted 
to providing access to medicines for rare diseases 
before MA. AIFA
Single patient access to specific drugs (law n. 
94/1998 and ministerial decree n. 8 May 2003)
RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN DRUGS An International Journal of Public Health page 87
August 2014, Volume 1, Number 3
www.rarejournal.orgOrphan Drug considerations in Health Technology Assessment in eight European countries
David Tordrup et al.
Poland n/a Therapeutic Programmes provide access to ex-
pensive drugs (including ODs). Ministry of Health
Direct funding through Ministry of Health in 
exceptional cases, eg. haemophilia in children.
Scotland Lower levels of evidence are accepted 
for clinical trials (e.g. on efficacy and 
safety), but with possible requirement for 
additional data in other areas (e.g. sur-
rogate markers and quality of life data)
IPTR9 may be used to gain access while medi-
cine is under appraisal by the SMC10
NHS Scotland 
Boards
Higher levels of uncertainty are accepted 
in the economic case for ODs
Requests for level 1 non-formulary drugs without 






Higher cost per QALY accepted in HTA (> 
£30,000) [including but not limited to: substan-
tial life expectancy or quality of life improve-
ment; no therapeutic alternatives]
SMC
Spain n/a Pricing and reimbursement takes into account, 
among other things: severity of indication; needs 
of patient groups; therapeutic options; and de-
gree of innovation 
Ministry of Health, 
Social Services 
and Equality
Sweden n/a Flexibility in willingness-to-pay threshold, due to 
disease severity (higher cost/QALY accepted) TLV11
Higher degrees of uncertainty accepted in the 
case of ODs
County Councils can decide to reimburse drugs 
independently of TLV recommendation [no 
criteria]
County Coun-
cils, New Drug 
Therapies board 
(if applicable)
Source: The authors based on information extracted by government agency websites and insights from 15 national key infor-
mants. 
Notes: 1NICE Highly Specialised Technologies; 2Independent Funding Request; 3Primary Care Trusts; 4Authorisation for Tem-
porary Use; 5Agence Nationale de Sécurité du Médicament et des Produits de Santé (French National Agency for Medicines and 
Health Products Safety); 6Marketing Authorisation; 7Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco (Italian Medicines Agency); 8Commissione Tec-
nico Scientifica (AIFA’s Technical Scientific Committee); 9Individual Patient Treatment Request; 10Scottish Medicines Consortium; 
11Tandvårds- och Läkemedelsförmånsverket (Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency).
Scotland (2), Spain (2) and Sweden (1). All 15 key informants gave their informed consent for their comments to be reported 
anonymously.
The study is not without limitations. First, it is a selective sample of 8 countries and does not include all EU-28 MS. Smaller 
or resource-poor MS are known to face access problems with regards to ODs [6,7] and the extent to which they have specific 
policies relating to orphan drugs is unknown. Second, the subject matter is relatively understudied and the literature search did 
not return any results relevant to orphan drug assessment for Poland, Spain and Sweden, but there was some input from the grey 
literature and insights from key informants. Finally, as this is a dynamically evolving policy field, this study may not have cap-
tured the very latest updates in some cases, although it is unlikely this will have influenced the study results or overall direction. 
RESULTS
Search results
For England, the search returned the formal proposal for the appraisal of ODs submitted by NICE to the Department of 
Health in 2006.  For France, the search did not identify documents describing particular processes for the appraisal of ODs. 
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Documents were identified describing the National Plan for Rare Diseases, as outlined in the relevant results section. For Ger-
many, the General Methods document published by the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare (Institut für Qualität 
und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) outlines the overall methodological approach taken by the agency. For 
Italy, no reference to RDs was found on the website of the Italian Society of Health Technology Assessment (Società Italiana di 
Health Technology Assessment, SIHTA). On the website of Italy’s National Agency of Regional Health Services (Agenzia Nazio-
nale per i Servizi Sanitari Regionali, AGENAS), there was reference to the inclusion of 109 new rare disease treatments in the 
basic benefits package, but no reference to processes or criteria for HTA in RDs. For Scotland, the search returned policy state-
ments described in detail in the relevant country section. For Poland, Spain and Sweden, no relevant documents were identified. 
NATIONAL POLICIES FOR ODs
In this section the policies and HTA criteria directly and indirectly used for rare diseases and orphan drugs are discussed 
that were revealed by the search, supplemented with the scientific literature and key informant input. In the sections that follow, 
countries appear in alphabetical order. The results of the review are summarised in Table 3. 
ENGLAND
In England there are centres of reference for some RDs, but recent evidence from the peer review literature suggests there 
are neither explicit policy measures nor research incentives for RDs or ODs [16, 17]. The value assessment procedure handled 
by NICE considers mainly cost-effectiveness, though additional criteria such as equity may also be considered [18]. In general, 
NICE does not appraise ODs routinely, but does so for those ODs that have an oncology indication. In response to ministe-
rial requests on how ODs might be appraised, NICE advised that many ODs, in particular for “ultra-orphan” conditions with a 
prevalence of less than 1 in 50,000, would have unacceptable incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) if no special criteria 
or weightings were applied, giving examples of drugs that cost approximately £200,000-£300,000 per Quality Adjusted Life Year 
(QALY) gained, where the normal threshold is approximately one tenth of these figures [19]. However, there were drugs with 
high ICERs that the appraisal committee has considered to be cost effective, such as in the case of Glivec for blast phase chronic 
myeloid leukaemia, where the ICER was calculated at £48,000 per QALY; but even for that case there were exceptional reasons 
enabling coverage.  
Until April 2013 ultra-orphan drugs had been appraised by a specialist agency known as the Advisory Group for National 
Specialised Services (AGNSS). The role of AGNSS was to advise health ministers on the services that should be nationally 
commissioned and the centres that should provide them, as well as on which products and technologies should or should not 
be nationally commissioned [20, 21]. Reforms that have been ongoing from the end of 2012 until currently, and regard mainly 
structural changes in the NHS (whereby Clinical Commissioning Groups [CCGs] are replacing Primary Care Trusts [PCTs] and 
the new NHS Commissioning Board [NHS CB] has been created), as well as a development of a strategy for RDs [20] will sepa-
rate the appraisal of drugs and services; drug appraisals will be handled by NICE, whereas service commissioning for people with 
RDs will be handled by the NHS CB [22]. 
The NICE Highly Specialised Technologies (HST) section will be responsible for appraising ultra-orphan drugs through a 
process that is largely similar to the existing Single Technology Appraisal process [23, 24]. The interim processes and methods 
for this section state that the topic selection will be based on the same criteria as those used by AGNSS. The recommendations 
made by the HST section are intended to inform which technologies should be adopted for national commissioning [25]. Where 
a positive recommendation by NICE is not likely on poor cost-effectiveness grounds or uncertainty on costs, manufacturers can 
propose a Patient Access Scheme (PAS) to facilitate patient access to a drug, including an orphan. England has so far focused 
mostly on financial-based PAS, which do not require outcome-based agreements [26]. 
When medicines are not recommended by NICE and therefore not made routinely available, patients can complete an In-
dependent Funding Request (IFR) to seek public reimbursement for their treatment. Before the recent NHS reforms, successful 
IFRs were funded by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Though IFRs are not specifically intended for RDs, treatments for RDs that 
are not routinely commissioned by PCTs, are within the scope of the scheme. However, when PCTs are presented with an IFR, 
they need to consider the “exceptionality” rule, that is, the grounds on which the PCT can justify funding for a patient when 
others from the same patient group are not being funded [27]. In April 2013 the NHS CB issued an interim policy statement 
based on which an IFR can only be made if (a) it does not concern a service development, (b) the patient’s particular medical 
situation does not apply to an existing commissioning policy, (c) the patient is able to participate in a clinical trial which requires 
individual funding by the NHS CB, or (d) the patient has a rare clinical condition, is not able to participate in a clinical trial and, 
therefore, the clinician wishes to test an existing treatment experimentally. NHS CB only considers IFRs if the number of patients 
presenting these particular circumstances per year is less than 5 and if the expected costs per patient are less than £150,000 per 
annum. The decision is made on the basis of (a) the potential benefits and risks of the treatment; (b) the biological plausibility 
of anticipated benefit for the patient based on evidence of this treatment in other similar disease states; (c) value for money; (d) 
affordability and priority compared to other competing needs; and (e) unfunded developments [28].
In November 2013 the Department of Health issued a “UK Strategy for Rare Diseases” outlining five key areas of action: 
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(a) the empowerment of people suffering from RDs; (b) the identification and prevention of RDs; (c) the diagnosis and early in-
tervention; (d) the coordination of care; and (e) the role of research into rare diseases. One of the 51 commitments of the Strategy 
is to ensure that costs and benefits of treatments are evaluated appropriately [29]. On this issue, the England Statement of Intent 
of February 2014 confirmed that the NHS would collaborate closely with NICE in the formal appraisal of technologies, including 
the HST, taking into account the specific needs of patients with RDs [30]. 
FRANCE
France has had a National Plan for Rare Diseases since 2005; there are currently 131 centres of reference and 501 cen-
tres of competence for 18 groups of RDs [31]. The original plan (2005-2008) was centred around 10 strategic priorities, which 
included improving access to treatment and the quality of patient care, as well as continuing efforts in favour of ODs [32]. The 
development of ODs is supported through special clinical research funding programmes, budgetary incentives and scientific 
advice from the National Agency for Medicines and Health Products Safety (Agence Nationale de Sécurité du Médicament et des 
Produits de Santé, ANSM) and the French HTA body (Haute Autorité de Santé, HAS). [16].
Under the existing system of value assessment, the Medical Service Rendered (Service Médical Rendu, SMR) reflects the 
medical benefit of a drug integrating disease severity and determining the extent to which a treatment can be reimbursed, while 
the Improvement in Medical Service Rendered (Amélioration du Service Médical Rendu, ASMR) is a measure of innovativeness 
and determines the reimbursement price of a new technology. A new system of HTA appraisal is currently being implemented, 
whereby a new therapeutic index rating (Index Thérapeutique Relatif, ITR) will classify new pharmaceuticals against existing 
comparators, based on clinical benefit, alternative treatments, patient subgroup interest, pharmaceutical preparation and other 
attributes. Moreover, all drugs will be evaluated on the basis of their cost-effectiveness [33].
There are no specific criteria or exemptions applied by HAS in the assessment of ODs; prices and reimbursement are set 
according to standard procedures applying to non-orphan technologies. The clinical evidence used in the OD SMR rating is 
based on the same clinical evidence submitted for regulatory approval by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which may be 
limited to Phase II trials and literature reviews [9]. However, the medical benefit is considered proven if the total budget impact 
for the indication is less than €30 million [34]. 
Almost all innovative drugs enter the French market as part of a price-volume agreement (PVA) with the goal to restrict 
treatment to the target population by defining a tiered repayment for different levels of sales. A price cut takes place at the end 
of the agreed period. This is for example the case of the ultra-orphan Soliris for paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria, which 
was supplied to all patients without restrictions. According to the agreement, the company would pay back to the national health 
insurance any turnover that exceeded an agreed maximum budget ceiling. Other types of managed-entry agreements (MEAs) 
in France include agreements on daily cost of treatment, study requirement, and risk-sharing agreements – or a combination of 
these [26]. 
Three types of fast-track procedures contribute to making medicines available with minimal delay: First, the Authorisation 
for Temporary Use (Autorisation Temporaire d’Utilisation, ATU) provides access to medicines before regulatory approval. The 
criteria for ATUs are life-threatening or rare diseases for which there is no alternative treatment, and the scheme is used for drugs 
with a good probability of a favourable benefit to risk balance [35]. Second, the Temporary Treatment Protocols are intended to 
temporarily extend the licensed indication of an existing medicine before the new indication receives regulatory approval [9]. 
One key informant confirmed that this process is progressively replaced by the Recommendation for Temporary Use (Recom-
mendation Temporaire d’Utilisation, RTU), which will allow utilisation and reimbursement of drugs out of their MA indication 
in hospital settings and community pharmacies. These drugs have to satisfy certain conditions, namely that they should (a) treat 
a rare disease or a chronic condition, (b) be necessary for the health of the patient and (c) be the only existing treatment for the 
particular condition. Third, fast-track procedures exist for medicines considered “a priori innovative”, allowing HAS to start the 
assessment before regulatory approval is obtained and make a reimbursement decision within a few weeks after MA [9]. As one 
key informant highlighted, for a drug to be considered innovative it must have a new therapeutic modality (mechanism of action, 
therapeutic class, target population, formulation/route of administration), cover an unmet clinical need and have demonstrated 
efficacy and tolerability. ATUs are granted by ANSM and fast-track procedures by HAS [9].
GERMANY
In Germany, pharmaceutical manufacturers are free to set ex-factory prices on all drugs with no government negotiations, 
international reference pricing or profit controls, though price setting generally takes into consideration the system of internal 
reference pricing for the reimbursement of medicines [36]. Medicines are automatically reimbursed after regulatory approval 
and the extent is determined by the additional therapeutic benefit: if there is no added benefit the medicine is included into the 
(internal) reference pricing system [9]. 
Though there are no specific pricing considerations for ODs, these are often characterised by having no therapeutic alter-
natives, making comparison with existing therapies impossible and theoretically resulting in free pricing [9]. The new Pharma-
ceutical Market Reorganisation Act (AMNOG), which rendered the early evaluation of the additional benefit of a pharmaceutical 
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product by the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) mandatory after (MA), treats ODs differently in that their additional benefit is 
considered proven with MA alone, provided their budget impact is less than €50 million per annum. Nevertheless, manufacturers 
need to submit a dossier so that G-BA assesses the level of additional benefit and uses this in price negotiations if needed [37]. A 
recent report found that the first four out of seven ODs to be launched through AMNOG were considered to offer only minor ad-
ditional benefit, while for two other ODs the benefit was considered non-quantifiable [38]. Either way, the G-BA issues an order 
forming the basis for negotiations on the reimbursement rate between the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds and the marketing authorisation holder (MAH) [39]. 
The Institute of Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) may be commissioned by the G-BA to carry out an early 
benefit evaluation [37]. The General Methods report published by IQWiG contains a section on “Benefit assessment of medical 
interventions” and a subsection (3.2.5) on “Benefits and harms in small populations” [40]. The latter states that, for small sample 
sizes, it is reasonable to accept a higher than 5% p-value (e.g. 10%) to prove statistical significance and to accept evidence from 
surrogate endpoints. 
Different types of MEAs have been implemented in Germany in the recent years. They all exist at a decentralised level and 
constitute agreements between the pharmaceutical companies and the sickness funds in order to speed up access to medicines 
that have an uncertain value. Recently, MEAs have been put under the provision of AMNOG, although manufacturers do not 
have the incentive to propose such an agreement, because when a drug is reimbursed by the G-BA, all sickness funds are obliged 
to reimburse it, whereas when a drug is not reimbursed, sickness funds are not allowed to reimburse it [26].  
ITALY
No specific provisions are envisaged for the value assessment of ODs in Italy. Negotiations for the prices of ODs take place 
between the Pricing and Reimbursement Committee of the Italian Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco, AIFA) and 
the pharmaceutical companies. These negotiations take into account the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (though no formal 
willingness-to-pay threshold is prescribed), the comparison with existing therapies, efficacy of the OD, price comparisons with 
other countries, projected uptake, budget impact analysis and other financial factors such as overall impact on investment [16, 
41]. The reimbursement procedure of AIFA considers clinical need, whether other therapies exist, the budget impact and cost-
effectiveness of the OD. According to one key informant, an unfavourable mix of low level of evidence on efficacy and safety, a 
high price proposed by the manufacturer and low resource availability of the National Health System, leads to non-reimburse-
ment. Under these circumstances, the OD can be reimbursed by the Local Health Authorities (Aziende Sanitarie Locali) and not 
by the National Health System. 
The legal framework in Italy has evolved over the past 18 years to enable better access to ODs. Four particular legislative 
interventions are worth noting with notable implications for OD use. First, a fast track mechanism is available in Italy under the 
Balduzzi Law (Law No. 189/2012), allowing ODs to enter the pricing and reimbursement negotiation before MA is obtained. 
Second, with regards to availability of ODs to patients, law No. 648/1996 enables Italian patients to gain access to innovative 
treatments for disorders for which no alternative therapy is available. The law applies to (a) (innovative) medicines already ap-
proved in other countries but not yet in Italy, (b) products which have demonstrated clear benefit while “under clinical investi-
gation” and (c) medicines destined for off-label use. A medicine is considered for inclusion under the 648/1996 law following 
an application to AIFA’s Technical Scientific Committee (Commissione Tecnico Scientifica, CTS) [42]. Third, the “Fondo AIFA 
5%”, established under Law No. 326/2003, is designed to promote ODs and medicines awaiting market entry. According to the 
law, half of the fund should be devoted to providing access to medicines for RDs before MA. The other half should be devoted 
to promote independent research and related activities. Finally, law n. 94/1998 and the ministerial decree of 8 May 2003 are in-
tended for specific situations where single patients need to obtain a drug and cover compassionate use. Based on these and using 
evidence from the literature, the physician must report that the patient cannot be treated with available drugs and that treatment 
with a drug under evaluation is indicated. 
To date, the first National Health Care Plan for Rare Diseases is under development in Italy and will cover the 2013-16 
period. In the first draft issued for public consultation on October 2012 [43], a specific section is devoted to ODs and is mainly 
focused on accessibility for patients. The draft plan also takes into consideration the CAVOD study on value assessment of ODs 
[14].
A variety of MEAs are used in Italy, including for ODs, in order to manage budget impact and uncertainty around clinical 
and cost-effectiveness, such as PVAs, cost-sharing, budget caps, therapeutic plans and monitoring registries, among others [26]. 
POLAND
The Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Poland (Agencja Oceny Technologii Medycznych, AOTM) acts as an 
advisory body to the Ministry of Health (MoH). AOTM produces recommendations for the inclusion or not of medicines in the 
benefits package. The review procedure includes a review of the submitted evidence as well as a search for new evidence, a review 
of the economic analysis, a recalculation of the submitted economic model and budget impact analysis. The recommendations of 
AOTM are not legally binding and the final decision rests with the MoH [44]. Both cost-effectiveness and cost-utility are allowed 
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in the economic assessment, as is cost-minimisation if the effectiveness of the interventions analysed are the same [45]. 
The current focus on Polish pharmaceutical policy is on efforts to keep pharmaceutical spending under strict control, which 
is the main goal of the Reimbursement Act, effective from 1st January 2012. Health technology assessment plays a role towards 
meeting this objective through the existence of an explicit willingness to pay (WTP) threshold set at three times the GDP per 
capita per QALY (for Cost-Utility Analysis) or Life-Year Gained (LYG) (for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis), which in 2013 was ap-
proximately PLN 105,000 (€24,500). Pricing arrangements are not differentiated for ODs. If the WTP threshold is exceeded, risk-
sharing schemes can be proposed. If there is a significant budget impact on the National Health Fund (NHF), a “rationalisation 
analysis” should be performed to propose sources of the additional funds required. Subsequently, AOTM appraises the price and 
the reimbursement is negotiated between the MAH and the Economic Commission of the MoH. 
The price of medicines is determined by the MoH and the reimbursement rate depends on the drug price relative to the 
minimum wage as well as whether the condition is acute or chronic.  Decisions are supported by the AOTM President and the 
advisory board (Transparency Council) and are valid for up to five years. An advisory board established by the MoH known as the 
Economic Commission negotiates drug prices. Pharmaceuticals outside the positive list may be priced freely [44, 46]. 
Reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Poland takes place under two main schemes, both of which are funded by the Na-
tional Health Fund. The first scheme concerns the pharmacy drugs of the reimbursement list, which can be obtained by patients 
for up to 50% of the reimbursement limit set by the Ministry of Health. The second covers drug programmes (formerly known 
as therapeutic programmes) that concern hospital therapies that are free of charge for specific groups of patients, such as those 
suffering from selected types of cancer, inflammatory diseases or rare diseases. Drugs financed under these programmes are free 
for patients, but inclusion/exclusion criteria are described in detail and a committee of experts makes decisions on the inclu-
sion of individual patients into the programme. The programme additionally implements a monitoring schedule, which informs 
whether the patient can stay in the programme according to pre-set criteria. It is the MAH who proposes inclusion in a therapeu-
tic programme that subsequently needs to be approved by the MoH [47]. Currently there are approximately 50 such programmes, 
some of which include more than one drug, although in some ways they have proved controversial. As a key informant stated, 
the therapeutic programmes are not intended to make ODs and other expensive drugs widely available, but, rather, to restrict 
access to patients who are likely to benefit. A key informant also confirmed that in exceptional circumstances ODs may be funded 
directly through the MoH rather than through the NHF. This is the case for haemophilia treatment for children, but there are no 
standard implementation rules across all drugs or programmes. 
Prior to January 2012, risk-sharing schemes in Poland were mainly informal and confidential. Currently, any scheme that 
decreases the price or increases patient access to treatment is permissible and the ability to negotiate these is enshrined into 
legislation, provided that the price be conditional on the sales of a drug, the reimbursement be conditional on the effectiveness 
and the statutory ex-factory price be conditional on ensuring partial supply of a drug with a rebate and on a partial pay-back 
of reimbursement [26]. Like most other settings applying risk-sharing agreements, strict confidentiality applies, with most of 
implemented agreements simply stating that the MAH is providing the product at a lower price. Discounting schemes form the 
majority of risk-sharing agreements in Poland, the remainder being various forms of payback schemes. 
SCOTLAND
The Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) assesses all medicines that have obtained marketing authorisation [48]. NHS 
Boards are responsible for the uptake of new medicines and may use SMC appraisals as guidance, but are not obliged to follow 
its recommendations. Until 2012 medicines designated as “unique” by the SMC, meaning no other therapeutic options were 
available, were introduced into NHS Scotland under national programmes [49, 50]. This special arrangement was removed in 
2012 as it was only invoked on one occasion since 2002, which was since annulled [51].
SMC applies the same procedure for ODs as for other drugs, but also recognises that less data on efficacy and safety may 
be available from clinical trials. In return, more detail may be required for other areas, for instance in the selection of particular 
surrogate markers or quality of life [52]. Though the SMC appraisal is intended to assess value for money based on a rigorous 
examination of clinical and cost-effectiveness, more flexibility in the decision making may be allowed in some specific circum-
stances. First, more uncertainty around the economic appraisal of a medicine may be accepted, and other modifying factors 
may be considered (life-threatening disease, increase in life expectancy and/or quality of life). Second, a higher than usual cost-
per-QALY may be accepted under certain circumstances. The SMC does not have a fixed threshold under which treatments are 
considered cost-effective, but may accept a higher than £30,000 cost-per-QALY threshold for new medicines if some criteria are 
met, including, but not limited to, evidence of substantial improvement in life expectancy (median gain of 3 months) or quality 
of life, ability to treat subgroups with higher benefit and absence of other therapeutic options [53]. 
Discounts, free doses and outcome-guarantee PAS have been so far implemented in Scotland. In many cases, but not all, 
the same PAS will be in place across the UK [26]. A Patient Access Scheme Assessment Group (PASAG), established under 
the auspices of NHS National Services Scotland, reviews and advises NHS Scotland on the feasibility of proposed schemes for 
implementation [54]. 
For drugs that are not recommended by SMC or not yet appraised, patients can make an Individual Patient Treatment 
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Request (IPTR) through their NHS Board to gain access to the drug. The Chief Medical Officer for Scotland has outlined that 
IPTRs should not be used as a way to circumvent established assessment procedures. IPTRs could be considered when a clini-
cian believes that a delay in treatment is putting the patient’s condition under threat [55]. As a key informant highlighted, there 
is also some use of non-formulary medicines across NHS Boards without having to resort to IPTR. These are for level 1 non-
formulary medicines that precede the SMC or NHS-Healthcare Improvement Scotland advice, or medicines not recommended 
by SMC, usually prescribed in very low quantities at low cost. They are monitored by local Prescribing Advisors who discuss their 
level of use with the practice during routine exchanges. All non-formulary and IPTR prescribing costs are met by the NHS Board 
medicines budget [55].
A medicines review published in May 2013 considered every aspect of the introduction of new medicines from national 
advice to local decision making to establish whether any improvements could be made [56, 57]. One of the recommendations 
was that SMC should develop a policy specifically relating to ultra-orphan medicines to guide the process of considering all 
available evidence relevant to its advice on these medicines. An interim recommendation from the review has already been in-
troduced, notably a £21 million fund for ultra-orphan medicines. Finally, following the UK Strategy for Rare Diseases [29], an 
Implementation Plan is currently being developed in Scotland in order to improve services for people suffering from RDs and 
their families [58].  
SPAIN
Regional HTA bodies in Spain are coordinated under the National Network of HTA Agencies and Units (AUnETS), hav-
ing previously collaborated in an informal and voluntary network with annual meetings [59]. This new national HTA network 
includes the HTA bodies at state and regional level. Although official legislation sets forth the criteria based on which new drugs 
will be assessed, including cost-effectiveness criteria, budget restrictions, reference pricing and value-based pricing [60], the use 
of cost-effectiveness is non-existent in the current setting and there is no clarity on the method of implementation and whether 
it should be based on QALYs or use an explicit threshold. The regulator negotiates prices with the manufacturer based on these 
criteria and external reference pricing with European countries, a system which will be supplemented by HTA evidence provided 
by regional agencies in the future. 
Regional HTA agencies have traditionally produced assessment reports on drugs to support and, frequently, to limit ap-
praisals made centrally by the Spanish Medicines Agency (Agencia Española de Medicamentos y Productos Sanitarios, AEMPS) 
in their respective regions. Some regions have “regional drug bulletin centres” which further evaluate medicines after AEMPS 
as an instrument for rational use of medicines. This is done against the current standard of care to assess the incremental value 
of the therapy. If there is no added value, the drug is not recommended for use.
Key informants from Spain mentioned that in the current system of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement the criteria 
applied include severity of illness, usefulness of the medicine, patient need, overall cost, existence of therapeutic alternatives and 
degree of innovation, although the latter criterion is vague and not quantified. 
The reimbursement of prescribed medicines for NHS patients is the responsibility of regional governments. The reimburse-
ment rate of most prescription outpatient medicines is 50-60% if prescribed by an NHS doctor, but may be as high as 90% for 
chronic or severe diseases. For vulnerable population groups the reimbursement rate is 100% [61]. One key informant confirmed 
that normally ODs are administered in inpatient settings and are, therefore, reimbursed 100%.
In Spain MEAs are implemented at regional level, usually as a PVA scheme; additional risk-sharing agreements can be 
implemented at individual hospital level and can be PVA and, exceptionally, pay-for-performance schemes. The expected num-
ber of units sold affects negotiated prices. Pharmacy directors in hospitals are those who decide how to manage the available 
budget; some choose to engage in confidential agreements, while others make information publicly available [26].
SWEDEN
The Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (Tandvårds- och Läkemedelsförmånsverket, TLV) grants reimbursement 
based on three criteria: cost-effectiveness, the human value principle (all human beings are of equal value), and the need and 
solidarity principle (resources should be first utilised where the need is greatest). Cost-effectiveness is established based on the 
submitted price and reimbursement is either granted unconditionally, or granted with requirements for evidence generation 
including for specific subgroups, or rejected [62 - 64]. 
Sweden uses the same criteria for rare and non-rare diseases. During the first years of TLV’s operation (2002 - 2005), sev-
eral ODs were approved for unconditional reimbursement despite weak cost-effectiveness data, showing a propensity to accept 
lower levels of evidence for ODs where limited budget impact was expected [65]. An analysis of all TLV decisions between 2002 
and 2007 suggests a positive correlation between severity of disease and willingness to pay, with costs-per-QALY in the region 
of €100,000 accepted for more severe conditions as compared with an average of €35,000/QALY [66]. It is, however, important 
to note that rarity per se does not have an influence on the willingness to pay. The human value principle implies equality of all 
people, while the principles of need and solidarity imply that conditions for which there is a greater need take precedence over 
others. In practice this means a higher cost-effectiveness threshold may be considered for ODs [16]. 
RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN DRUGS An International Journal of Public Health page 93
August 2014, Volume 1, Number 3
www.rarejournal.orgOrphan Drug considerations in Health Technology Assessment in eight European countries
David Tordrup et al.
As per current arrangements, TLV acts as a regulatory body for drugs consumed on an out-patient basis. For in-patient 
drugs, alternative arrangements apply and the county councils play a significant role. At regional level, county councils are free 
to purchase and provide whichever drugs they deem appropriate for their populations in addition to those they are recommended 
to provide based on TLV’s decisions. All drugs are financed from the county council budget. The Association of county councils 
(Sveriges Kommuner og Landsting, SKL) has a special board for New Drug Therapies (Nya Läkemedelsterapier, NLT) which as-
sesses and makes recommendations on drugs not recommended by TLV, which county councils are free to implement or not [67]. 
Most MEAs in Sweden are part of a conditional reimbursement scheme, which means that reimbursement is granted with 
restrictions on the indication or the patient sub-group. In certain cases TLV may request manufacturers to provide additional 
clinical and cost-effectiveness data in order to obtain definitive coverage after the initial period of conditional coverage. TLV 
focuses mostly on cost-effectiveness and real-life use including compliance, but some agreements also look at long-term effects 
on morbidity and mortality [26]. Other MEA types include discounting and pay-for-performance schemes (or a combination of 
these) and in recent years such schemes have been concluded at county council level.
During an ongoing enquiry on the Swedish pricing system, an extensive ethical discussion on ODs was undertaken. The 
enquiry did not lead to an official position on the issue, but this is expected in the next report due in 2014 [68]. The existing 
legislation is almost ten years old and does not mention ODs. As a result, without legislative support it is difficult to use different 
criteria for ODs.
DISCUSSION
There is considerable variation in the general methodology of value assessment as well as the way this applies to ODs across 
countries. In some cases prices are based on added clinical benefit, which is the case in France (ASMR rating) and indirectly in 
Germany, where pricing is free, but reimbursement is determined by the level of added benefit. By contrast in Sweden, a broad 
societal perspective is adopted when performing economic evaluations. England and Scotland apply a narrower approach to cost 
effectiveness and consider benefits and costs to health and, if applicable, social care. In Sweden, Scotland and England, the value 
assessment and, consequently, the price of a new therapy is an integrated consideration over the costs and benefits viewed as a 
whole. Poland and England are the only countries that use an explicit cost-effectiveness threshold, which is based on a multiple 
of the GDP per capita and a range between £20,000-£30,000/QALY respectively. In Sweden, a ‘derived’ WTP threshold has been 
identified through meta-analysis and stands at €100,000/QALY. In Sweden, Spain and Italy, the devolved healthcare systems 
leave less of a role for HTA, though this is beginning to change or is likely to change in the future with new legislation. Finally, 
national regulatory/HTA bodies may have partial competence over the totality of drugs consumed in the country (e.g. TLV in 
Sweden is responsible for out-patient drugs mostly).
In England there are no specific policies for RDs or ODs, although a UK-wide new strategy has been launched recently, triggering 
debate and reaction in England and Scotland. According to ongoing reforms, NICE in England will handle the appraisal of drugs and 
the NHS Commissioning Board will handle the appraisal of services. For drugs that are not reimbursed, patients have the option of an 
Independent Funding Request. France is currently in the process of implementing a new therapeutic index rating using some criteria 
particularly relevant to ODs. Existing policies like the Authorisation for Temporary Use, Temporary Treatment Protocols and fast-track 
HTA procedures also help in making new technologies available with no delay. Despite the absence of a specific RD policy, Germany 
has implemented some criteria for HTA which apply to ODs: higher p-values for small sample sizes; use of surrogate endpoints; and 
additional benefit considered proven at MA if the budget impact does not exceed the €50 million per year. In Italy, the first National 
Health Care Plan for Rare Diseases is currently under development. Half of the fund “Fondo AIFA 5%” is devoted to providing ac-
cess to ODs before MA and additional policies exist that help patients access ODs (fast-track mechanisms and single patient access 
to specific drugs). Though there are no specific HTA measures for ODs in Poland, the therapeutic programmes provide access to ex-
pensive medicines (including ODs) and there is also the option of direct funding through the MoH. In Scotland, the SMC applies the 
same procedure for ODs as it does for all other drugs, although it accepts lower levels of evidence from clinical trials, as well as more 
uncertainty in economic evaluations. Other policies relevant to ODs include Individual Patient Treatment Requests, a specific non-
formulary process and higher cost-per-QALY. There is no OD policy implemented in Spain, but pricing and reimbursement takes into 
account, among other things, severity of indication, needs of patient groups and therapeutic options. Finally, in Sweden TLV is flexible 
and accepts a higher willingness-to-pay threshold for treatments for severe conditions. County Councils can decide to reimburse drugs 
independently of TLV. 
Risk-sharing or MEAs, whether financial, outcomes-based or a combination, are frequently used in England, France, Italy, 
Poland, Scotland and Sweden and in order to address uncertainties about the clinical value and the high cost of medicines in-
cluding ODs. The outcome of risk sharing is greater certainty for the health system, for example, based on pay-for-performance 
or a lower price for an expensive drug through a confidential discount or conditional reimbursement through additional data 
generation.
The above leave little room for a common approach to the value assessment of ODs. The question is if individual country value 
assessment methods offer flexibility to the appraisal of ODs, or if the countries have set up specific policies to enable patients to gain 
access to these drugs. Indeed, most study countries have some mechanisms in place to increase access to ODs. Some countries rec-
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ognise the limited evidence available for ODs and accept lower statistical significance of clinical benefits. This is the case of Germany 
and Scotland, where lower levels of evidence are accepted for clinical trials. Scotland accepts lower thresholds on efficacy and safety 
evidence, but other areas may require additional information, such as surrogate markers and quality of life data. Germany also considers 
the drug’s additional benefit proven at MA if the budget impact is less than €50 million per year and France has a similar budget impact 
threshold of €30 million. Sweden does not have an explicit policy for ODs, but, according to a key informant, tends to be “pragmatic” 
in their approach, usually accepting a higher ICER for orphan drugs than for non-orphans and a greater degree of uncertainty for 
diseases with fewer patients.
In what concerns the threshold of £20,000-£30,000 per QALY in England, a closer examination suggests that this may not be 
rigidly adhered to for orphan and cancer treatments. In some cases, drugs with base case ICERs up to £59,000 per QALY were rec-
ommended even if the drug was considered not to be cost-effective, although this suggests that, for some medicines, greater weight is 
placed on other factors (patient need, ethics and lack of alternative treatments), like in the case of sunitinib for advanced renal cancer 
[1]. England has no explicit remit for ODs unless it is for cancer indications; cancer drugs have a prioritisation in the selection process. 
Even in the case of being rejected by NICE, these drugs have still the chance to be included in the list of the NHS Cancer Drugs Fund 
(CDF) [69], which provides an additional £200 million per year to help cancer patients accessing treatments that are not routinely 
funded by the NHS. It also takes into account Individual CDF Requests (ICDFRs) for drugs that treat rarer types of cancers, including 
those affecting children. The creation of the fund was justified on the basis that: “. . .it is possible that society values health benefits to 
patients with cancer more highly, all else being equal, than benefits to patients suffering from other conditions” [70]. 
Two other countries, Scotland and Italy, have specific provisions for the funding of orphan drugs; in the former, a £21 mil-
lion fund has been made available for the funding of ultra-orphan drugs whereas, in the latter, the “Fondo AIFA 5%” aims at 
facilitating access to ODs, in general [71].
Other regulatory mechanisms are not specifically intended for ODs, but may be well suited to facilitate patient access none-
theless. This is the case for Authorisations for Temporary Use (ATU), Temporary Treatment Protocols and fast-track HTA assess-
ment in France. ATUs are considered for severe diseases with no treatment alternatives, while fast-track assessment is considered 
for drugs that are innovative, cover unmet need and have demonstrated efficacy and safety.  Seventy two percent of ODs with a 
MA have been administered to patients via an ATU, 34 months on average before the MA [72]. 
When ODs do not receive a positive value assessment from national agencies, there are still a number of options for 
patients. Some countries consider individual patient requests, such as the Individual Funding Request in England and the In-
dividual Patient Treatment Request in Scotland. The legal framework in Italy provides access to innovative treatments for condi-
tions where no alternative therapy is available. However, these are tools that apply in exceptional circumstances, rather than for 
systematically gaining access to a medicine for a group of patients with a rare disease. In addition to the above, risk sharing and 
managed entry schemes are increasingly implemented across the surveyed countries. In circumstances where there is significant 
uncertainty about the therapeutic benefit and the cost of the treatment, a variety of managed entry schemes are found to be 
implemented, ranging from pure discounting schemes to conditional coverage and pay-for-performance. 
CONCLUSIONS
Though there are certain similarities across countries with regards to the Health Technology Assessment and reimburse-
ment of ODs, significant differences exist, which are likely to continue to cause variations in access to ODs across EU MS. Al-
though special considerations seem to be in place in most of the study countries, in principle enabling access to ODs, it is likely 
that there are equity implications within the EU as citizens may be treated differently across countries; some countries place ODs 
rapidly on the market after MA is granted, others are considering faster access prior to MA being granted, whereas in other cases 
access is slower. An important implication that emerges from this study is that conventional HTA probably fails to address the 
precise specificities of and requirements posed by ODs and in so doing forces countries that use it to apply special considerations, 
often on an ad hoc basis, enabling their coverage by health insurance. Future research should attempt to quantify these special 
considerations and include them explicitly in value assessment methodologies. Future research should also explore ways of ap-
proximating structures for OD coverage, access and, potentially, procurement across EU member states.
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